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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
opinion apparently is based upon the idea that the time element was the
only material factor.15 This, however, is a departure from the sound rule
of Sconce v. Jones, holding that the time element is one, but not the only,
type of evidence for proving the spontaneity of the statement.
R. H. E.
TAxATioN-INTnRmsT ON "OVERPAYMENTS'--RECOVERY Or INTEREST ON
VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS IN ExcEss or AMOUNT DuE-[Federal].-On the
date of federal estate tax and return were due, a thirty day extension for
filing the return was granted, and the trustee sent a check for the estimated
amount of the tax, which upon filing of the return was found to be exces-
sive. The taxpayer sued for interest on the excess from the due, date to
the date of the refund. Held: This was a voluntary remittance based on
the taxpayer's own estimate and not an "overpayment" within the meaning
of the statute governing payment of interest. Busser v. United States.,
The Internal Revenue Act provides that "interest shall be paid upon any
overpayment in respect of any internal revenue tax at the rate of six per
cent per annum."'2 The Supreme Court has not yet determined the appli-
cation of this statute to a factual situation similar to the principal case.
The decisions of the lower federal courts have split into two lines of author-
ity. In the case of Moses v. United States,3 a district court held that such
a voluntary remittance was a deposit rather than an overpayment, and that
consequently the taxpayer could recover no interest on it. 4 The court rea-
soned that the payment was entirely voluntary, a benefit to the taxpayer,
and an accommodation rather than a requirement by the government. Ac-
cordingly, it decided that the government should not have to pay interest,
especially since the amount was based solely upon the taxpayer's estimate
and since any excess was the result of his own inaccuracy. This view seems
to be analogous to earlier state decisions on state tax laws,5 although the
15. Brinkley v. United Biscuit Co. of America (Mo. 1942) 164 S. W.
(2d) 825, 830.
1. (C. C. A. 3, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 537.
2. Internal Revenue Act (1928) 45 Stat. 876, c. 852, §614(a); 26 U. S.
C. A. §3771(a).
8. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 817.
4. Moses v. United States (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 817, 818.
The court said that although it might regard the sum as a payment to the
extent of the actual liability, any excess over that amount could not be
considered a discharge of a valid obligation.
5. Cf. Socolow v. Murphy (1927) 219 App. Div. 184, 219 N. Y. S. 78,
where the court held that a voluntary estimated payment permits more
leisurely settlement to the benefit of the taxpayer, and that to allow interest
would offer a convenient method for an executor to deposit funds. But
note that there was no directly applicable statute in this case, and that
the executor had not determined the amount for five years; it might well
be inferred that interest could be allowed under different circumstances;
Kaemmerling v. State (1924) 81 N. H. 405, 128 Atl. 6. No interest was
allowed, but the statute in this case provided that the time for payment
could be extended until the amount was determined, without any penalty
or increased liability for the delay, and did not specifically provide for
interest on the amount of the overpayment.
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Moses case appears to be the first decided under the federal statute, and,
considering the length of time the statute has been in operation, there have
been surprisingly few decisions on the point by the federal courts. In At-
lantic Oil Producing Company v. United States,0 the Court of Claims al-
lowed interest in a similar case, expressly refusing to follow Moses v.
United States. Responding to the government's contention that the com-
pany had only made a deposit, the court in this case held that an "over-
payment" meant a payment that more than satisfied the debt, and that the
only requirement was that the payment be made "in respect of" the tax
liability. The deposit was said to be a payment of a debt then due, the
amount of which had not been ascertained.7 The circuit court in the prin-
cipal case chose the rule of the Moses case on the grounds that, first, since
the time for the filing of the return had been extended, the payment was
entirely voluntary and for the benefit and at the request of the taxpayer,
and second, that if interest were allowed, money could be invested with the
government intentionally, at attractive interest rates.
The instant case places the taxpayer in a peculiar position. Apart from
statute, he could not recover interest s or even the overpayment itself.0 Un-
der the federal statutes, if he underpays or makes no payment until the
return is filed, he is charged six per cent interest on the amount of the
tax from the original due date until the time of payment.10 But if he pays
an amount which will surely cover the liability, by the rule of the prin-
cipal case he is not entitled to any return upon the excess, though he has
6. (1940) 92 Ct. Cl. 441, 35 F. Supp. 766. Compare the statement here
that there was an obligation, though the amount was uncertain (which
caused it to be an "overpayment") with the view of the Moses case, note
4, supra.
7. In Busser v. United States (D. C. E. D. Penn. 1942) 45 F. Supp.
327, the lower court in the principal case, followed the Atlantic Oil Pro-
ducing Co. case, adding that if an'overpayment existed only where there
was an exact knowledge of the amount due, overpayments would be rare,
and also that since the government charged interest on underpayments, it
should allow interest on overpayments. See Chicago Title and Trust Co. v.
United States (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1941) 45 F. Supp. 323, where the tax as
tentatively determined by the government was paid under protest to re-
lease a lien on the estate; the court distinguished the Moses case on the
ground that it involved a voluntary payment, but recognized and approved
the decision in the Atlantic case, though it was distinguishable on the same
ground. Cf. Tserioni v. United States (1941) 94 Ct. Cl. 142, where the
claimants alleged that the amount paid was a deposit, not subject to the
statute of limitations, and the court held that it was not a deposit, citing
the Atlantic case.
8. Tillson v. United States (1879) 100 U. S. 43; United States v. North
Carolina (1890) 136 U. S. 211; See notes, 57 A. L. R. 357, 76 A. L. R.
1012, 112 A. L. R. 1183.
9. Elliot v. Swartwout (1836) 10 Pet. 137; United States v. Norton
(1877) 97 U. S. 164; Railroad Company v. Commissioners (1878) 98 U. S.
541; Little v. Bowers (1890) 134 U. S. 547; Chesebrough v. United States
(1904) 192 U. S. 253; Carr v. City of Memphis (C. C. A. 6, 1927) 22 F.
(2d) 678.
10. Internal Revenue Act (1926) 44 Stat. 76, c. 27, §309 (a) (1), as
amended by (1935) 49 Stat. 1027, c. 829, §404; 26 U. S. C. A. §893 (a) (1),
(b) (1).
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been precluded from the use of this money himself. Thus, the rule is ex-
tremely hard on the taxpayer. Moreover, as a matter of statutory interpre-
tation, it seems that the language of the act favors the taxpayer's claim.
Since the payment is in excess of the amount actually due, there is an
"overpayment" within any fair definition of the word, and the statute
should apply. The fact that the estimation is made by the taxpayer himself
should be considered only when the overestimation is not in good faith. But
the principal case has a firm practical basis. The fear of intentional over-
payments by shrewd taxpayers is not purely imaginary. Due to economic
changes the interest rate of six per cent prescribed by the statute, while
not excessive at the time the statute was enacted,1 is now well above normal
interest rates. Such a rate, offered by the government, presents a particu-
larly attractive investment. The real solution would thus seem to lie in an
alteration of the statute so that it would allow interest either at a rate con-
sonant with present conditions or at a "reasonable" rate which could vary
with economic conditions. If this were done, the desire of the courts to avoid
paying an excessive interest rate would not force them to the rather
strained conclusion that such sums are not "overpayments"; then the stat-
ute's real purpose, to protect the taxpayer who pays his obligation (though
the amount may be uncertain) from loss, could be served, without fear of
abuse. R. E. H.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ARISING "OUT OF" THE EM[PLOYENT-
"SPEcIAL HAZARD"-[Illinis].-Employees of defendant were working on
hospital grounds on which there was a single water tap which was supplied
from a public water system. Water was brought from this tap by bucket
to the workmen by water boys employed by defendant. The employees and
several other persons who drank water from this same tap contracted
typhoid fever. The arbitrator and commission found that the employees, by
drinking the contaminated water, furnished them by their employer, suf-
fered accidental injuries arising "out of" their employment. Held, affirmed
on appeal. Permanent Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission.,
An accidental injury arises "out of" the employment when there is ap-
parent to the rational mind upon consideration of all circumstances, a
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required
to be performed and the resulting injury.2 Under the majority view "the
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood."3 The mere fact that the employee is in the neighborhood
11. May 29, 1928. 45 Stat. 876, c. 852, §614(a) ; 26 U. S. C. A. §3771(a).
1. (Ill. 1942) 43 N. E. (2d) 557.
2. Mazursky v. Industrial Commission (1936) 364 Ill. 445, 449, 4 N. E.
(2d) 823, 825; Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn (Ind. 1942) 39
N. E. (2d) 499; In re McNicol (1913) 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697; Adams
v. Industrial Commission (1939) 65 Ohio App. 74, 29 N. E. (2d) 228;
Ashbrook v. Industrial Commission (1939) 136 Ohio St. 115, 24 N. E.
(2d) 33.
8. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Commission (1920)
291 Ill. 256, 126 N. E. 144; Permanent Construction Co. v. Industrial.
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